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No como tú, que pones el ataque de Pearl Habour como excusa para el lanzamiento de la bomba atómica.
Porque como Morzhilla sabe, para que los USA pudieran lanzar una bomba atómica lo suyo era dejarse bombardear
¿qué cojones ganaban dejándose pillar totalmente por sorpresa y dejándose hundir la flota? ¿Por qué no dispersarla con la excusa de unas maniobras un par de días antes y que los japos se encontraran un puerto semivacío? ¿Por qué no organizar una defensa fuerte y que no los pillaran echados? ¿Por qué no haber combinado esa defensa desde tierra con un ataque desde los 3 portaaviones americanos que estaban fuera de Pearl Harbor (y que se salvaron) sobre los portaaviones japoneses que estaban indefensos tras lanzar sus aviones?
No soy un ávido lector sobre el tema, pero lo de que los EE.UU. despejaron Pearl Harbor, casualmente, justo antes del ataque, me parecía que era algo que ya estaba aceptado. Y más sorprendente aún era que las unidades que sucumbieron ante el ataque japonés fueran las menos modernas, estando las más actualizadas y caras de reponer en una posición más replegada, por si la cosa se iba de madre.
Desde luego que a nadie se le ocurriría pensar que una nación como Estados Unidos osase utilizar un ataque a sus tropas o población con fines más allá de una respuesta proporcional. Es algo que jamás harían y no hay indicios de nada parecido en los últimos 100 años de historia.
Edito: Se ve que lo que digo es "conspiranoia" y el argumento más aceptado es este que copio y pego calentito de la wikipedia y la entrada sobre la conspiración de Pearl Harbor:
None of the three U.S. Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers were in Pearl Harbor when the attack came. This has been alleged by some to be evidence of advance knowledge of the attack by those in charge of their disposition; the carriers were supposedly away so as to save them (the most valuable ships) from attack.
In fact, the two carriers then operating with the Pacific Fleet, Enterprise and Lexington, were on missions to deliver fighters to Wake and Midway Islands, which were intended in part to protect the route used by planes (including B-17s) bound for the Philippines. (The third, Saratoga, was in routine refit in Puget Sound, at the Bremerton shipyard.) At the time of the attack, Enterprise was about 200 mi (170 nmi; 320 km) west of Pearl Harbor, heading back. In fact, Enterprise had been scheduled to be back on December 6, but was delayed by weather. A new arrival estimate put her arrival at Pearl around 07:00, almost an hour before the attack, but she was also unable to make that schedule.
Furthermore, at the time, aircraft carriers were classified as fleet scouting elements, and hence relatively expendable.[SUP][116][/SUP] They were not capital ships. The most important vessels in naval planning even as late as Pearl Harbor were battleships (per the Mahan doctrine followed by both the U.S. and Japanese navies at the time).[SUP][117][/SUP] Carriers became the Navy's most important ships only following the attack.
At the time, naval establishments all over the world regarded battleships, not carriers, as the most powerful and significant elements of naval power. Had the U.S. wanted to preserve its key assets from attack, it would almost certainly have focused on protecting battleships. It was the attack on Pearl Harbor itself that first helped vault the carrier ahead of the battleship in importance. The attack demonstrated the carrier's unprecedented ability to attack the enemy at a great distance, with great force and surprise. The U.S. would turn this ability against Japan. Elimination of battleships from the Pacific Fleet forced the Americans to rely on carriers for offensive operations.
In fact, the two carriers then operating with the Pacific Fleet, Enterprise and Lexington, were on missions to deliver fighters to Wake and Midway Islands, which were intended in part to protect the route used by planes (including B-17s) bound for the Philippines. (The third, Saratoga, was in routine refit in Puget Sound, at the Bremerton shipyard.) At the time of the attack, Enterprise was about 200 mi (170 nmi; 320 km) west of Pearl Harbor, heading back. In fact, Enterprise had been scheduled to be back on December 6, but was delayed by weather. A new arrival estimate put her arrival at Pearl around 07:00, almost an hour before the attack, but she was also unable to make that schedule.
Furthermore, at the time, aircraft carriers were classified as fleet scouting elements, and hence relatively expendable.[SUP][116][/SUP] They were not capital ships. The most important vessels in naval planning even as late as Pearl Harbor were battleships (per the Mahan doctrine followed by both the U.S. and Japanese navies at the time).[SUP][117][/SUP] Carriers became the Navy's most important ships only following the attack.
At the time, naval establishments all over the world regarded battleships, not carriers, as the most powerful and significant elements of naval power. Had the U.S. wanted to preserve its key assets from attack, it would almost certainly have focused on protecting battleships. It was the attack on Pearl Harbor itself that first helped vault the carrier ahead of the battleship in importance. The attack demonstrated the carrier's unprecedented ability to attack the enemy at a great distance, with great force and surprise. The U.S. would turn this ability against Japan. Elimination of battleships from the Pacific Fleet forced the Americans to rely on carriers for offensive operations.
Lo cual no significa que no lo supieran, sino que según algunos, los portaaviones no valían un pimiento y si lo hubieran sabido habrían desplazado los otros barcos, que tenían más puntos en el Risk. Irrefutable.
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