Libros Il nomine della Rosa. Vamos a deshojarla.
- Iniciador del tema faloni
- Fecha de inicio
Leyenda
faloni
Veterano
- Registro
- 23 Feb 2005
- Mensajes
- 1.507
- Reacciones
- 2
cahegi rebuznó:
Si. puede ser que sea un recurso estético.
Pero ojo con el hijoputa de Ecco. Me explico.
Ecco es un especialista en la mística iniciática. Un especialista. Si así lo asumimos, esa última frase tendrá un significado que Ecco jamás te revelará. Muy al contrario, uno, desde la teoría iniciática, debe desconfiar por definición de las apostillas ya que, de nuevo por deficinición, lo que Ecco proporcionará serán pistas para desorientar a los no iniciados.
Es masón aquel que así se proclama?. Obviamente no, porque la masonería, como en general cualquier orden secreta, es eso, secreta. Por ello, siguiendo en el puro ejercicio de la lógica y la realidad, aquel que te desvela un secreto necesariamente te lo oculta ya que sino no sería secreto.
Se que suena confuso pero aquellos que saben de que hablo me entenderán.
Desconfiad de Ecco.
Quizás tengas razón y haya algo oculto bajo el título, de ser así estaría en sintonía total con la obra, en cualquier caso se trata de un título magnífico.
Yo si creo que hay un ganador en la obra, es Jorge de Burgos y por tanto Guillermo pierde. La victoria de uno es la derrota del otro ya que se trata de un trade off, quizás en la dialéctica del Finis Africae Guillermo vence a Jorge, pero solo en eso. Jorge lo tiene todo planeado, incluso sabe que va a morir y en su muerte sepultará los secretos que con tanto celo ha estado guardando durante tantos años. De alguna manera es un martir, incluso se lleva por delante al gañan del abad que si mal no recuerdo es al único que se carga con premeditación y alevosía. Hemos comentado que la fe y la razón son polos opuestos, pero curiosamente Guillermo al final, cuando la abadía esta en llamas parece perder la fe en Dios, es decir, su derrota, la derrota de la razón le termina llevando a dudar de la existencia de Dios, la derrota de la razón es la derrota de la fe.
Otra figura que se va de rositas es Bernardo Gui, no muere como sucede en la película , sino que sale airoso de su duelo. Otro personaje importante es Malaquias, leal ejecutor de Jorge. En general todos los personajes malos parecen estar imbuidos por la locura y la demencia de la fe ciega, pero su caracterización no es la de traidores, falsos , desleales o mentirosos, atributos propios de malos , sus acciones parecen estár guiadas por un noble fin, la custodia y preservación del saber centenario de la biblioteca que con tanto esfuerzo y sacrificio han conseguido. En fin , es un libro complicado y abierto a varias interpretaciones pero como suele ocurrir el final dice mucho de la opinión del autor, al menos yo lo he entendido así.
Yo si creo que hay un ganador en la obra, es Jorge de Burgos y por tanto Guillermo pierde. La victoria de uno es la derrota del otro ya que se trata de un trade off, quizás en la dialéctica del Finis Africae Guillermo vence a Jorge, pero solo en eso. Jorge lo tiene todo planeado, incluso sabe que va a morir y en su muerte sepultará los secretos que con tanto celo ha estado guardando durante tantos años. De alguna manera es un martir, incluso se lleva por delante al gañan del abad que si mal no recuerdo es al único que se carga con premeditación y alevosía. Hemos comentado que la fe y la razón son polos opuestos, pero curiosamente Guillermo al final, cuando la abadía esta en llamas parece perder la fe en Dios, es decir, su derrota, la derrota de la razón le termina llevando a dudar de la existencia de Dios, la derrota de la razón es la derrota de la fe.
Otra figura que se va de rositas es Bernardo Gui, no muere como sucede en la película , sino que sale airoso de su duelo. Otro personaje importante es Malaquias, leal ejecutor de Jorge. En general todos los personajes malos parecen estar imbuidos por la locura y la demencia de la fe ciega, pero su caracterización no es la de traidores, falsos , desleales o mentirosos, atributos propios de malos , sus acciones parecen estár guiadas por un noble fin, la custodia y preservación del saber centenario de la biblioteca que con tanto esfuerzo y sacrificio han conseguido. En fin , es un libro complicado y abierto a varias interpretaciones pero como suele ocurrir el final dice mucho de la opinión del autor, al menos yo lo he entendido así.
G
Geoffroi de Charney
Guest
Juvenal rebuznó:
Este es el dibujo que Adso realiza sobre la biblioteca y no parece mucho un mapa del mundo.
Esta ilustración de la portada representa el laberinto de la biblioteca como una rosa. Esta claro que puede ser verdad, mentira o ambas cosas a la vez como insinua Umberto Eco en las Apostillas
Ramon Llull
Asiduo
- Registro
- 19 Sep 2005
- Mensajes
- 743
- Reacciones
- 0
Un poco más de información sobre nuestro franciscano; sin duda, uno de los escolásticos y contrario a los universales más interesantes.
Es un ladrillo en inglés, pero con un poco de paciencia se pueden extraer los puntos esenciales de su pensamiento teológico.
Life
William of Ockham, the Franciscan school man, nominalist, and "doctor invincibilis," was born at Ockham in 1280 and died in Munich on April 10, 1349. Of his early life, little is known. From the scarce data, it may be concluded that he entered the Franciscan order at an early age. He received his bachelor's degree at Oxford, and his master's at Paris, where he taught from a date between 1315 and 1320. The tradition that he was a pupil of Duns Scotus is probably correct. There is no evidence that he returned to England and taught at Oxford. In any case, it is with Paris that his principal teaching activity is connected. His doctrines had taken such hold there by 1339 that the philosophical faculty felt obliged to issue a warning against them. By that time he himself had left Paris. The question of poverty which so deeply agitated his order determined the later course of his life. He threw all his strength into the defense of the ideal of absolute poverty. But it was not long before their common ground of opposition to the pope drew the extreme Franciscans together with the Emperor Louis the Bavarian, the opponent of John XXII. At the chapter of the order in Perugia, Ockham and Bonagratia were the chief supporters of the general Michael of Cesena. They supported his strict views, and afterward they spent some time in the dioceses of Ferrara and Bologna, urgino, considering the absolute poverty of Christ and the apostles as a necessary ideal. In December, 1323, he was summoned with some others to appear before the pope at Avignon, and was imprisoned there for over four years. On May 25, 1328, Michael of Cesena and Bonagratia made his escape and fled to Italy. Deposed and excommunicated, they made common cause with the emperor, who was then in Italy. In 1329 a general chapter held in Paris deposed Michael of Cesena from his office, and two years later he and his adherents were expelled from the order. Ockham became one of the emperor's principal advisers and literary defenders. The political ideas which he had already represented in Paris were now developed and adapted to the circumstances of the time. In stepping outside the range of pure theology, he never forgot that he was a theologian. The belief that John XXII. was a heretic and no true pope, that the poverty of Christ and the apostles was an article of faith, were as much a part of his fixed belief as that the State and the rights of the emperor were independent of pope and Church. After the unfortunate issue of Louis' visit to Rome, the Franciscans followed him to Munich in Feb., 1330 and took up their abode in a neighboring house of the order, where most of the political writings of Ockham were composed. In 1342 Michael of Cesena died, transmitting the seal of the order and his claims to its headship to Ockham. The death of Louis on Oct. 11, 1347 , the loss of some of the Munich group, and the reconciliation of the new Emperor Charles IV. with the papacy, left Ockham increasingly alone. Eventually, the time came when he was the only one of the old leaders left. He was once more cited in 1349 before the papal tribunal, but the negotiations came to naught with his refusal to admit that Louis was a heretic and schismatic. Clement VI. demanded that the order should take action. A chapter held in Whitsuntide, 1349, asserted that but few brothers remained who had supported Michael of Cesena and Louis; that " William the Englishman," who was prominent among these, had sent back the seal of the order to the general, and that he and the others, while they could not conveniently appear in Rome, petitioned for release from their excommunication. On June 8, 1349, The pope offered to grant this request on condition of their subscribing a formula which was somewhat less stringent than that which had been usual since John XXII. Trithemius, Wadding, and others assert that Ockham signed this and was absolved. However, there is no documentary evidence to this effect, and Jacobus de Marchia says expressly that the three principal leaders "remained excommunicated heretics." This is more probably the case, whether Ockham remained inflexible or death intervened too soon to allow his acceptance of the terms of peace. The date of his death is uncertain; he was undoubtedly alive in the spring of 1349, and thus the date given on his monument (of later construction) in the former Franciscan chapel at Alunich (April 10, 1347) cannot be right. The day and month may be accepted, but the year will be either 1350, or more probably 1349. This would account for the theory that he had announced his readiness to make submission, but died before it could be accomplished.
Writings
There is no complete edition of the works of Ockham, which can serve as an indicator of the disfavor into which he fell by his rebellious attitude. Although the numerous manuscripts and early printed editions testify to the interest which was felt in his writings. Under the head of philosophical works may be named the Expositio aurea et admodum utilis super totam artem veterem. This work, in the form of commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry, contains Ockham's logic, epistemology, metaphysic, Summa logices, Qucestiones in octo libros physicorum, Summultv in libros physicorum, and two or three works still unprinted. The principal theological work is Quoestiones et decisiones in quatuor libros sententiarum. The first book is much fuller than the other three and is frequently found in manuscripts independent of them. This leads us to believe that Ockham published it before the other three and on a much larger scale. Other theological treatises are the Centiloquium theologicum, "embracing almost the whole of speculative theology under one hundred conclusions," which gives a interesting collection of instances of what rational theology might consider possible. Quodlibeta septem, deals with the principal problems of philosophy and theology, based probably on the disputations with which he began his Paris teaching. De Sacramento altaris and De corpore Christi, two parts of one work, which was used to supply theoretical support for Luther's eucharistic doctrine (De prcedestinatione et futuris contingentibus).
Nominalism
The great revival of philosophical and theological study which the thirteenth century witnessed was conditioned by the influence of Aristotle. The theory of the universe propounded by the Stagirite had to be reconciled with the traditional Platonic-Augustinian realism. This Thomas Aquinas undertook to do, following, Aristotle as closely as possible. Duns Scotus, on the other hand, attempted to maintain the ancient realism, while supporting it by modern or Aristotelian methods. Interests and tendencies, however, came up in his work which drove his disciples away from his position. The growth of empirical research and psychological analysis together with the new activity of the reason in the epistemological field on the one side, and the recognition of the fact that the specific and the particular was the end of nature on the other, led to results widely divergent from those of Scotus. Here was Ockham's work ready to his hand. He was the leader of the nominalists, the founder of the "modern" school. Science has to do, he maintains, only with propositions, not with things as such, since the object of science is not what is but what is known. Things, too, are always singular, while science has to do with general concepts, which as such exist only in the human mind. Scotus had deduced the objective existence of universals from the concepts originated under the operation of the objects. Ockham, on the other hand, asserts that "no universal is a substance existing outside of the mind," and proves it by a variety of keen logical reasons. He rejects even the milder forms of philosophic universalism, such as the theory that the universal is something in particulars which is distinguished from them not realiter but only formaliter. He considers the universal without qualification as an "intention" of the mind, a symbol representing conventionally several objects. In respect of the theory of cognition, where Duns Scotus had placed between the perceiving subject and the object perceived a "sensible species" and an "intelligible species," Ockham considers these as superfluous machinery. Objects call forth sense-impressions in us, which are transmuted by the active intellect into mental images. These images are thus a product of the intellect, not species which flow from the object into the intellectus possibilis. The reality of these images is thus, in the modern use of the terms, not objective but subjective. This is true not merely of the "terms of first intention" formed directly from sense-impression, but also of the "terms of second intention," i.e., the abstract terms which take note of common attributes, or universals. These latter correspond to a tendency of the human mind, which can not perceive individuals without at the same time attempting to form a general concept. A white object simultaneously suggests abstract whiteness; an extended, related, enduring object forces the conception of extension, relation, duration. The result of this line of reasoning is the absolute subjectivity of all concepts and universals and the limitation of knowledge to the mind and its concepts-although these are real entities because of their subjective existence in the mind, reproducing the actual according to the constitution of the mind. Thus Ockham is really the pioneer of modern epistemology. The mysterious universals with their species in the sense of objective realities are abolished. Objects work upon the senses of men, and out of these operations the active intellect frames its concepts, including the so-called universals, which, while they are in themselves subjective, yet correspond to objective realities. By the statement that science has nothing to do directly with things, but only with concepts of them, the theory of knowledge assumes vital import for the progress of science, and a new method of scientific cognition is made available. Of course this increases the difficulty of the task of theology. However, Ockham was essentially of a skeptical and critical temperament, of great critical acumen, but (especially in the religious province) he was by no means equally great in constructive ability. He did not have the broad general conception of religion which guided his master Scotus through his attempts to criticize the old evidences and bring up new ones. Where Ockham shows its power at all, it is usually simply borrowed from Scotus.
Nature of God
In regard to the nature and attributes of God, he applies a critical solvent to the principal proof given by Scotus for God's existence. Ockham shows that the reality of God as the infinitus intensive can as little be demonstrated from efficientia, causalitas, eminentia, as from the divine knowledge of the infinite or from the simplicity of his nature. Nevertheless, he considers the recognition of God to proceed from the idea of causality. If not by strict syllogistic deduction, then " by authority and reason." In the same sort of way, the infinity of God is confirmed. As to his unbounded power and absolute will, Ockham distinguishes potentia absolute and potentia ordinate, the two being, however, only different modes of considering a power which is essentially one. In practice it is always ordinate, the absolute power being merely the hypothetical possibility of God's doing anything whatever which does not involve a contradiction in terms. The absolute freedom of God is the characteristic trait in the theology of Ockham. The entire scheme of salvation planned by the voluntas ordinate is based on no inner necessity, but is determined by the fact that it pleased God. As a matter of fact, to please God and nothing else. The distinction of the two aspects of the divine power comes in here. The merits of the saints, e.g., are accepted as valid only because it pleases God to accept them-but since it has pleased God to establish this system, merit is absolutely necessary. God and his grace do all, yet only in such a way that the cooperation of man is required. The freedom of the human will cannot be, strictly speaking, demonstrated, but is recognized as true by experience. Sin consists in the violation of the will of God. By it, however, no "real" change takes place in the soul. Sin consists in individual acts; it does not take away freedom nor weaken the soul, but simply destroys the future good, the reward, ordained by God for those who do his will. Since there is no fundamental connection between sin and punishment, God could by his absolute power forgive sin and infuse grace even without repentance. In the same connection appears the relation of original sin to original righteousness. The latter is "an absolute something superadded to man as he is in a state of nature"; the former is "a certain lack of the righteousness which he ought to have." Thus original sin is the result of the divine ordinance; God wills to consider the offender against his law as unworthy of acceptance, together with all his posterity. This explains his view of the immaculate conception of Mary. As a member of the human race, she would have been in the first instant of her conception a debtor to original righteousness. However, it is not inconceivable that God should have chosen to renounce the exaction of that righteousness from her and refused to impute its absence as a fault. By a subtle train of reasoning he concludes that she was not even for an instant in original sin.
Reason and Authority
According to his attitude toward the dogmas of the Church, it appears that "authority, reason, and experience" are the sources of religious knowledge. A scientific proof of dogma is impossible. This he shows by the method of evolving a number of propoitions which on ecclesiastical principles ought to be possible, but actually contradict the doctrine of the Church. The instances are frequently rather startling; but it would be quite misleading to understand them in the sense of anti-ecclesiastical unbelief or frivolous skepticism. Ockham's purpose is to show that reason is useless as a foundation of ecclesiastical dogma. The infidel can " attain all the knowledge, whether simple or complex, which the believer can have"; the difference is in the possession of faith. The act of belief depends on the fides infusa, and proceeds from the cooperation of this with the fides arquisita derived from instruction, Bible-reading, and intelligent meditation on various truths. Theology is not thus in the strict sense a science; it is not a form of natural metaphysical cognition, but a special mode of cognition effected by the operation of the infused "habit" of faith. In the application of these principles to the faith of the church of his day, Ockham accepts and even enhances the ecclesiastical positivism of Scotus. The faith of the Church must be accepted in toto, either explicitly or implicitly. Reason may question the doctrines or ordinances of the Church, but the Christian as a Christian accepts them. The more critical activity awoke, the more need there was for this counterbalancing thought. The legal conception of the Church finds expression here; he who wishes to belong to it must subject himself to its laws, whether or not he is personally convinced of their justice. Here again there is need of the miraculous fides infusa. However, this is itself an article of faith which is learned only by authority, not "by reason, by experience, or by logic." So it comes back to the point that a man must accept the teachings of the Church because he wishes to belong to it. The authority of the Church's teaching was essentially based, for Ockham, on that of the Bible. This in itself was nothing new, as all the scholastics (following Augustine) had regarded church doctrine as the formulated expression of Scriptural truth. The novelty here is that Ockham is driven by the party conflicts of his day into acknowledging that the authorities of the day may diverge from Scriptural teaching. Thus he comes to a more consciously strict application of the principle of Scriptural infallibility. Popes and councils may err, but the written word is sure. "A Christian is not bound to believe, as necessary to salvation, anything which is neither contained in the Bible nor may be plainly and of necessity inferred from what is contained there." It is true that he does not realize how far this principle might lead, or how far it was one day going to lead Luther. He also does not seem disposed to apply it except where the necessities of his own position, as in the controversy on poverty, forced him to it. In practice, throughout his whole dogmatic system, the authority of the Fathers and of the Roman Catholic Church stands out as coequal with that of the Scripture. In fact, the Church has the last word, and the doctrine of transubstantiation (which is not expressly taught in Scripture) is unquestioningly accepted on that authority.
Christology
In his Christology, Ockham holds firmly to the hypostatic union, while distinguishing sharply between the two natures. As with Duns Scotus, so here the union consists in a "relation," the human nature being assumed by the divine. The special result of Christ's work is to be seen in the institution and operation of the sacraments. The operation is described in a manner usual in Franciscan theology; grace does not reside in them, but they are signs that God, in accordance with his institution, will accompany their administration with his grace. Grace is taken in a twofold sense, an infused quality of the mind by which man is enabled to act according to God's will, and divine acceptation, "the gratuitous will of God." Following Scotus again, Ockham is conscious of strong objections to the doctrine of the necessity of an infused "habit" of grace; and it is quite clear that the retention of it in his system is due merely to submission to authority. Under the head of the sacraments, his fullest treatment is given to the Eucharist, where he follows the consubstantiation theory which after Scotus was becoming common. Neither Scripture nor reason contradicts the possibility of the substance of bread, not merely the accidents, remaining together with the substance of the body of Christ; nor is transubstantiation taught in Scripture. He goes at considerable length into the question of the possibility of the presence of Christ in the sacrament. For him as a nominalist, quantity is a thing which has no existence in itself, but only the res quanta. Now quantity can increase or diminish, and thus a thing may be without quantity, like a mathematical point; this is the manner in which the body of Christ exists in the sacrament of the altar. In this way he comes to agree with Thomas Aquinas, that the body of Christ is present "after the manner of substance, not after that. of quantity" (Summa, III., lxxvi. 1). The criticism of Duns Scotus, that a substance without attributes is unthinkable, is avoided by the assertion that quantity is not an essential property of substance. While to some extent he prepared the way for Luther's teaching on the Lord's Supper, the difference between his doctrine of ubiquity and Luther's must not be overlooked. As to the sacrament of penance, like most of the later scholastics, Ockham lays most stress on the absolution. Since, as shown above, sin effects no "real" change in the soul, its destruction consists in the non-imputation of guilt. This might have been brought about, had God so willed, by an internal act of repentance on the part of a sinner having proper dispositions. Sin being an act of the will, the detestation of it by the same will is the appropriate means for its destruction, and in fact necessary, contrary to the view of Scotus that God gives his grace to the sinner through the sacrament without either attrition or contrition. But the essence of the sacrament, according to Ockham, lies in the deliverance of the sinner from the guilt of sin by God through the agency of the priest.
Church and State
In the important questions as to the external organization of the Church and its relation to the State, two principal motives guided Ockham to his conclusions. Accusing John XXII. of attempting to subjugate or destroy the empire and to prove erroneous and illicit the thorough-going poverty of the Franciscans, he met him by attempting on the one hand to make a sharp distinction between the Church and the world, and on the other by showing the limitations and errors of the official ecclesiastical authorities. Like Marsilius of Padua, he contends that the papal power extends only to spiritual things. The apostles were subject to the secular authorities of their time and were far from claiming any temporal jurisdiction. Even the necessity of the papacy may be called in question; and if so, much less is there any necessary dependence of the emperor on the pope. The choice of the electors makes an emperor, who needs no papal confirmation. The relation of pope and emperor is discussed not only from the standpoint of the historic civil law, but from that of natural law as well. The idea of natural law had come down from the ancients to both canonists and civilians, as a criterion of the justice of positive enactments; the popes had employed it often enough against civil rulers, and now it was turned against themselves. The trouble with this criterion, however, was that it was too elastic; it could be stretched to include the most revolutionary conclusions in both Church and State. Ockham undoubtedly believed in the logical validity of his critical statements; but a complete overturning of the ecclesiastical organism was as far from his temperament as the creation of a new system of Scriptural theology. He never strove for anything more than a certain amelioration of existing conditions within the circle of the system, and his most reasonable demands went to pieces on the positivism of the nominalist. He was anything but timid; but he went on criticizing and constructing, and then doubting once more both his critical and his constructive work.
Es un ladrillo en inglés, pero con un poco de paciencia se pueden extraer los puntos esenciales de su pensamiento teológico.
Life
William of Ockham, the Franciscan school man, nominalist, and "doctor invincibilis," was born at Ockham in 1280 and died in Munich on April 10, 1349. Of his early life, little is known. From the scarce data, it may be concluded that he entered the Franciscan order at an early age. He received his bachelor's degree at Oxford, and his master's at Paris, where he taught from a date between 1315 and 1320. The tradition that he was a pupil of Duns Scotus is probably correct. There is no evidence that he returned to England and taught at Oxford. In any case, it is with Paris that his principal teaching activity is connected. His doctrines had taken such hold there by 1339 that the philosophical faculty felt obliged to issue a warning against them. By that time he himself had left Paris. The question of poverty which so deeply agitated his order determined the later course of his life. He threw all his strength into the defense of the ideal of absolute poverty. But it was not long before their common ground of opposition to the pope drew the extreme Franciscans together with the Emperor Louis the Bavarian, the opponent of John XXII. At the chapter of the order in Perugia, Ockham and Bonagratia were the chief supporters of the general Michael of Cesena. They supported his strict views, and afterward they spent some time in the dioceses of Ferrara and Bologna, urgino, considering the absolute poverty of Christ and the apostles as a necessary ideal. In December, 1323, he was summoned with some others to appear before the pope at Avignon, and was imprisoned there for over four years. On May 25, 1328, Michael of Cesena and Bonagratia made his escape and fled to Italy. Deposed and excommunicated, they made common cause with the emperor, who was then in Italy. In 1329 a general chapter held in Paris deposed Michael of Cesena from his office, and two years later he and his adherents were expelled from the order. Ockham became one of the emperor's principal advisers and literary defenders. The political ideas which he had already represented in Paris were now developed and adapted to the circumstances of the time. In stepping outside the range of pure theology, he never forgot that he was a theologian. The belief that John XXII. was a heretic and no true pope, that the poverty of Christ and the apostles was an article of faith, were as much a part of his fixed belief as that the State and the rights of the emperor were independent of pope and Church. After the unfortunate issue of Louis' visit to Rome, the Franciscans followed him to Munich in Feb., 1330 and took up their abode in a neighboring house of the order, where most of the political writings of Ockham were composed. In 1342 Michael of Cesena died, transmitting the seal of the order and his claims to its headship to Ockham. The death of Louis on Oct. 11, 1347 , the loss of some of the Munich group, and the reconciliation of the new Emperor Charles IV. with the papacy, left Ockham increasingly alone. Eventually, the time came when he was the only one of the old leaders left. He was once more cited in 1349 before the papal tribunal, but the negotiations came to naught with his refusal to admit that Louis was a heretic and schismatic. Clement VI. demanded that the order should take action. A chapter held in Whitsuntide, 1349, asserted that but few brothers remained who had supported Michael of Cesena and Louis; that " William the Englishman," who was prominent among these, had sent back the seal of the order to the general, and that he and the others, while they could not conveniently appear in Rome, petitioned for release from their excommunication. On June 8, 1349, The pope offered to grant this request on condition of their subscribing a formula which was somewhat less stringent than that which had been usual since John XXII. Trithemius, Wadding, and others assert that Ockham signed this and was absolved. However, there is no documentary evidence to this effect, and Jacobus de Marchia says expressly that the three principal leaders "remained excommunicated heretics." This is more probably the case, whether Ockham remained inflexible or death intervened too soon to allow his acceptance of the terms of peace. The date of his death is uncertain; he was undoubtedly alive in the spring of 1349, and thus the date given on his monument (of later construction) in the former Franciscan chapel at Alunich (April 10, 1347) cannot be right. The day and month may be accepted, but the year will be either 1350, or more probably 1349. This would account for the theory that he had announced his readiness to make submission, but died before it could be accomplished.
Writings
There is no complete edition of the works of Ockham, which can serve as an indicator of the disfavor into which he fell by his rebellious attitude. Although the numerous manuscripts and early printed editions testify to the interest which was felt in his writings. Under the head of philosophical works may be named the Expositio aurea et admodum utilis super totam artem veterem. This work, in the form of commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry, contains Ockham's logic, epistemology, metaphysic, Summa logices, Qucestiones in octo libros physicorum, Summultv in libros physicorum, and two or three works still unprinted. The principal theological work is Quoestiones et decisiones in quatuor libros sententiarum. The first book is much fuller than the other three and is frequently found in manuscripts independent of them. This leads us to believe that Ockham published it before the other three and on a much larger scale. Other theological treatises are the Centiloquium theologicum, "embracing almost the whole of speculative theology under one hundred conclusions," which gives a interesting collection of instances of what rational theology might consider possible. Quodlibeta septem, deals with the principal problems of philosophy and theology, based probably on the disputations with which he began his Paris teaching. De Sacramento altaris and De corpore Christi, two parts of one work, which was used to supply theoretical support for Luther's eucharistic doctrine (De prcedestinatione et futuris contingentibus).
Nominalism
The great revival of philosophical and theological study which the thirteenth century witnessed was conditioned by the influence of Aristotle. The theory of the universe propounded by the Stagirite had to be reconciled with the traditional Platonic-Augustinian realism. This Thomas Aquinas undertook to do, following, Aristotle as closely as possible. Duns Scotus, on the other hand, attempted to maintain the ancient realism, while supporting it by modern or Aristotelian methods. Interests and tendencies, however, came up in his work which drove his disciples away from his position. The growth of empirical research and psychological analysis together with the new activity of the reason in the epistemological field on the one side, and the recognition of the fact that the specific and the particular was the end of nature on the other, led to results widely divergent from those of Scotus. Here was Ockham's work ready to his hand. He was the leader of the nominalists, the founder of the "modern" school. Science has to do, he maintains, only with propositions, not with things as such, since the object of science is not what is but what is known. Things, too, are always singular, while science has to do with general concepts, which as such exist only in the human mind. Scotus had deduced the objective existence of universals from the concepts originated under the operation of the objects. Ockham, on the other hand, asserts that "no universal is a substance existing outside of the mind," and proves it by a variety of keen logical reasons. He rejects even the milder forms of philosophic universalism, such as the theory that the universal is something in particulars which is distinguished from them not realiter but only formaliter. He considers the universal without qualification as an "intention" of the mind, a symbol representing conventionally several objects. In respect of the theory of cognition, where Duns Scotus had placed between the perceiving subject and the object perceived a "sensible species" and an "intelligible species," Ockham considers these as superfluous machinery. Objects call forth sense-impressions in us, which are transmuted by the active intellect into mental images. These images are thus a product of the intellect, not species which flow from the object into the intellectus possibilis. The reality of these images is thus, in the modern use of the terms, not objective but subjective. This is true not merely of the "terms of first intention" formed directly from sense-impression, but also of the "terms of second intention," i.e., the abstract terms which take note of common attributes, or universals. These latter correspond to a tendency of the human mind, which can not perceive individuals without at the same time attempting to form a general concept. A white object simultaneously suggests abstract whiteness; an extended, related, enduring object forces the conception of extension, relation, duration. The result of this line of reasoning is the absolute subjectivity of all concepts and universals and the limitation of knowledge to the mind and its concepts-although these are real entities because of their subjective existence in the mind, reproducing the actual according to the constitution of the mind. Thus Ockham is really the pioneer of modern epistemology. The mysterious universals with their species in the sense of objective realities are abolished. Objects work upon the senses of men, and out of these operations the active intellect frames its concepts, including the so-called universals, which, while they are in themselves subjective, yet correspond to objective realities. By the statement that science has nothing to do directly with things, but only with concepts of them, the theory of knowledge assumes vital import for the progress of science, and a new method of scientific cognition is made available. Of course this increases the difficulty of the task of theology. However, Ockham was essentially of a skeptical and critical temperament, of great critical acumen, but (especially in the religious province) he was by no means equally great in constructive ability. He did not have the broad general conception of religion which guided his master Scotus through his attempts to criticize the old evidences and bring up new ones. Where Ockham shows its power at all, it is usually simply borrowed from Scotus.
Nature of God
In regard to the nature and attributes of God, he applies a critical solvent to the principal proof given by Scotus for God's existence. Ockham shows that the reality of God as the infinitus intensive can as little be demonstrated from efficientia, causalitas, eminentia, as from the divine knowledge of the infinite or from the simplicity of his nature. Nevertheless, he considers the recognition of God to proceed from the idea of causality. If not by strict syllogistic deduction, then " by authority and reason." In the same sort of way, the infinity of God is confirmed. As to his unbounded power and absolute will, Ockham distinguishes potentia absolute and potentia ordinate, the two being, however, only different modes of considering a power which is essentially one. In practice it is always ordinate, the absolute power being merely the hypothetical possibility of God's doing anything whatever which does not involve a contradiction in terms. The absolute freedom of God is the characteristic trait in the theology of Ockham. The entire scheme of salvation planned by the voluntas ordinate is based on no inner necessity, but is determined by the fact that it pleased God. As a matter of fact, to please God and nothing else. The distinction of the two aspects of the divine power comes in here. The merits of the saints, e.g., are accepted as valid only because it pleases God to accept them-but since it has pleased God to establish this system, merit is absolutely necessary. God and his grace do all, yet only in such a way that the cooperation of man is required. The freedom of the human will cannot be, strictly speaking, demonstrated, but is recognized as true by experience. Sin consists in the violation of the will of God. By it, however, no "real" change takes place in the soul. Sin consists in individual acts; it does not take away freedom nor weaken the soul, but simply destroys the future good, the reward, ordained by God for those who do his will. Since there is no fundamental connection between sin and punishment, God could by his absolute power forgive sin and infuse grace even without repentance. In the same connection appears the relation of original sin to original righteousness. The latter is "an absolute something superadded to man as he is in a state of nature"; the former is "a certain lack of the righteousness which he ought to have." Thus original sin is the result of the divine ordinance; God wills to consider the offender against his law as unworthy of acceptance, together with all his posterity. This explains his view of the immaculate conception of Mary. As a member of the human race, she would have been in the first instant of her conception a debtor to original righteousness. However, it is not inconceivable that God should have chosen to renounce the exaction of that righteousness from her and refused to impute its absence as a fault. By a subtle train of reasoning he concludes that she was not even for an instant in original sin.
Reason and Authority
According to his attitude toward the dogmas of the Church, it appears that "authority, reason, and experience" are the sources of religious knowledge. A scientific proof of dogma is impossible. This he shows by the method of evolving a number of propoitions which on ecclesiastical principles ought to be possible, but actually contradict the doctrine of the Church. The instances are frequently rather startling; but it would be quite misleading to understand them in the sense of anti-ecclesiastical unbelief or frivolous skepticism. Ockham's purpose is to show that reason is useless as a foundation of ecclesiastical dogma. The infidel can " attain all the knowledge, whether simple or complex, which the believer can have"; the difference is in the possession of faith. The act of belief depends on the fides infusa, and proceeds from the cooperation of this with the fides arquisita derived from instruction, Bible-reading, and intelligent meditation on various truths. Theology is not thus in the strict sense a science; it is not a form of natural metaphysical cognition, but a special mode of cognition effected by the operation of the infused "habit" of faith. In the application of these principles to the faith of the church of his day, Ockham accepts and even enhances the ecclesiastical positivism of Scotus. The faith of the Church must be accepted in toto, either explicitly or implicitly. Reason may question the doctrines or ordinances of the Church, but the Christian as a Christian accepts them. The more critical activity awoke, the more need there was for this counterbalancing thought. The legal conception of the Church finds expression here; he who wishes to belong to it must subject himself to its laws, whether or not he is personally convinced of their justice. Here again there is need of the miraculous fides infusa. However, this is itself an article of faith which is learned only by authority, not "by reason, by experience, or by logic." So it comes back to the point that a man must accept the teachings of the Church because he wishes to belong to it. The authority of the Church's teaching was essentially based, for Ockham, on that of the Bible. This in itself was nothing new, as all the scholastics (following Augustine) had regarded church doctrine as the formulated expression of Scriptural truth. The novelty here is that Ockham is driven by the party conflicts of his day into acknowledging that the authorities of the day may diverge from Scriptural teaching. Thus he comes to a more consciously strict application of the principle of Scriptural infallibility. Popes and councils may err, but the written word is sure. "A Christian is not bound to believe, as necessary to salvation, anything which is neither contained in the Bible nor may be plainly and of necessity inferred from what is contained there." It is true that he does not realize how far this principle might lead, or how far it was one day going to lead Luther. He also does not seem disposed to apply it except where the necessities of his own position, as in the controversy on poverty, forced him to it. In practice, throughout his whole dogmatic system, the authority of the Fathers and of the Roman Catholic Church stands out as coequal with that of the Scripture. In fact, the Church has the last word, and the doctrine of transubstantiation (which is not expressly taught in Scripture) is unquestioningly accepted on that authority.
Christology
In his Christology, Ockham holds firmly to the hypostatic union, while distinguishing sharply between the two natures. As with Duns Scotus, so here the union consists in a "relation," the human nature being assumed by the divine. The special result of Christ's work is to be seen in the institution and operation of the sacraments. The operation is described in a manner usual in Franciscan theology; grace does not reside in them, but they are signs that God, in accordance with his institution, will accompany their administration with his grace. Grace is taken in a twofold sense, an infused quality of the mind by which man is enabled to act according to God's will, and divine acceptation, "the gratuitous will of God." Following Scotus again, Ockham is conscious of strong objections to the doctrine of the necessity of an infused "habit" of grace; and it is quite clear that the retention of it in his system is due merely to submission to authority. Under the head of the sacraments, his fullest treatment is given to the Eucharist, where he follows the consubstantiation theory which after Scotus was becoming common. Neither Scripture nor reason contradicts the possibility of the substance of bread, not merely the accidents, remaining together with the substance of the body of Christ; nor is transubstantiation taught in Scripture. He goes at considerable length into the question of the possibility of the presence of Christ in the sacrament. For him as a nominalist, quantity is a thing which has no existence in itself, but only the res quanta. Now quantity can increase or diminish, and thus a thing may be without quantity, like a mathematical point; this is the manner in which the body of Christ exists in the sacrament of the altar. In this way he comes to agree with Thomas Aquinas, that the body of Christ is present "after the manner of substance, not after that. of quantity" (Summa, III., lxxvi. 1). The criticism of Duns Scotus, that a substance without attributes is unthinkable, is avoided by the assertion that quantity is not an essential property of substance. While to some extent he prepared the way for Luther's teaching on the Lord's Supper, the difference between his doctrine of ubiquity and Luther's must not be overlooked. As to the sacrament of penance, like most of the later scholastics, Ockham lays most stress on the absolution. Since, as shown above, sin effects no "real" change in the soul, its destruction consists in the non-imputation of guilt. This might have been brought about, had God so willed, by an internal act of repentance on the part of a sinner having proper dispositions. Sin being an act of the will, the detestation of it by the same will is the appropriate means for its destruction, and in fact necessary, contrary to the view of Scotus that God gives his grace to the sinner through the sacrament without either attrition or contrition. But the essence of the sacrament, according to Ockham, lies in the deliverance of the sinner from the guilt of sin by God through the agency of the priest.
Church and State
In the important questions as to the external organization of the Church and its relation to the State, two principal motives guided Ockham to his conclusions. Accusing John XXII. of attempting to subjugate or destroy the empire and to prove erroneous and illicit the thorough-going poverty of the Franciscans, he met him by attempting on the one hand to make a sharp distinction between the Church and the world, and on the other by showing the limitations and errors of the official ecclesiastical authorities. Like Marsilius of Padua, he contends that the papal power extends only to spiritual things. The apostles were subject to the secular authorities of their time and were far from claiming any temporal jurisdiction. Even the necessity of the papacy may be called in question; and if so, much less is there any necessary dependence of the emperor on the pope. The choice of the electors makes an emperor, who needs no papal confirmation. The relation of pope and emperor is discussed not only from the standpoint of the historic civil law, but from that of natural law as well. The idea of natural law had come down from the ancients to both canonists and civilians, as a criterion of the justice of positive enactments; the popes had employed it often enough against civil rulers, and now it was turned against themselves. The trouble with this criterion, however, was that it was too elastic; it could be stretched to include the most revolutionary conclusions in both Church and State. Ockham undoubtedly believed in the logical validity of his critical statements; but a complete overturning of the ecclesiastical organism was as far from his temperament as the creation of a new system of Scriptural theology. He never strove for anything more than a certain amelioration of existing conditions within the circle of the system, and his most reasonable demands went to pieces on the positivism of the nominalist. He was anything but timid; but he went on criticizing and constructing, and then doubting once more both his critical and his constructive work.
Juvenal
Clásico
- Registro
- 23 Ago 2004
- Mensajes
- 3.254
- Reacciones
- 3
He dicho que la biblioteca se organiza geográficamente, como si fuera un mapa. Por lo demás, el dibujo me recuerda más a un edificio, a un torreón que a una rosa.
De acuerdo, si se basa los argumentos en una portada cualquiera de una edición cualquiera del libro, entonces no hay más que hablar.
G
Geoffroi de Charney
Guest
No creo que merezca la pena discutir sobre algo que nadie sabe cual es la respuesta correcta en el caso de que exista una sola. Simplemente aclarar que la portada corresponde a la Traducción de Ricardo Pochtar para Col. Palabra en el tiempo nº 148 Lumen, 1982 , que es la primera edición en castellano de El nombre de La Rosa, no es una edición cualquiera.
la disposicion de los libros en la biblioteca sirve para orientar al bibliotecario. los libros de autores del norte estan en el torreon orientado hacia el norte y asi con los otros 3 torreones , por eso que sea una disposicion del mapa del mundo, ed, no significa que tenga forma asi, sino se trata de orientarby agilizar la busqueda del bibliotecario. este hecho se oculta deliberadamente en el catalogo del scriptorium para evitar revelar una orientacion en el laberinto.
en cualquier caso aun si el titulo es asi por la forma def edificio no me parece muy logico ya que titular una obra por la forma de las torres me resulta bastante raro que esa explicacion no la de Eco o almenos si no la dice insinuar que es esa.Yo creo que que con el titulo se le aparecio la virgen y le quedo de puta madre y como no significa 'nada y pueden ser varias cosas(cuyo simbilismo en ese caso me pareceria algo 'infantil' para la envergadura de la obra). a falta deuna explicacion mas convincente me quedo con eso.
que agustito se esta tumbado en la cama navegando con mi maquinita, pero quecoñazo el teclado.
por cierto alguien sabe que abadia puede ser, esta al lado del mar en el norte de italia , he visto una en internet con torreones muuy parecidos pe o no iguales.
en cualquier caso aun si el titulo es asi por la forma def edificio no me parece muy logico ya que titular una obra por la forma de las torres me resulta bastante raro que esa explicacion no la de Eco o almenos si no la dice insinuar que es esa.Yo creo que que con el titulo se le aparecio la virgen y le quedo de puta madre y como no significa 'nada y pueden ser varias cosas(cuyo simbilismo en ese caso me pareceria algo 'infantil' para la envergadura de la obra). a falta deuna explicacion mas convincente me quedo con eso.
que agustito se esta tumbado en la cama navegando con mi maquinita, pero quecoñazo el teclado.
por cierto alguien sabe que abadia puede ser, esta al lado del mar en el norte de italia , he visto una en internet con torreones muuy parecidos pe o no iguales.